Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 18 Volume XVIII
Number 3 Volume XVIII Book 3

Article 4

2008

Intellectual Property and Americana, or Why IP Gets the Blues
Michael J. Madison
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, madison@pitt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Madison, Intellectual Property and Americana, or Why IP Gets the Blues, 18 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 677 (2008).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

MADISON_022508_FINAL

2/25/2008 7:19:44 PM

Intellectual Property and Americana, or
Why IP Gets the Blues
Michael J. Madison*
I.
This Essay examines briefly some “cultural models” of the
twentieth century for insights applicable to “business models” of
the twenty-first century. It does so in light of an early proposition
of the law and economics of intellectual property law.
Intellectual property lawyers got fascinated by “business
models” around the time that two emerging trends converged
roughly a decade ago. First, the distributed technical architecture
of the Internet was realized commercially and socially via the
original Napster file-sharing technology, which enabled massive
unauthorized distribution of copyrighted musical recordings in
digital form. From the standpoint of the businesses themselves,
Napster and its legitimate cousins—eBay and Amazon.com—
threatened to submerge the distinction between business models
used by firms that created or distributed intellectual property, on
the one hand, and the objects of intellectual property rights
themselves, on the other.1 Second, and around the same time, the
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2734. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Research, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law. Copyright © 2007 Michael J. Madison. Email: madison@pitt.edu. Thanks to
George Taylor, Rebecca Tushnet, and Siva Vaidhyanathan for their comments and
suggestions. Thanks to Daniel Corbett for excellent and enthusiastic research assistance.
1
See generally Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital
Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 389–404 (2005) (describing the authoritative
character of “things” in the law). For examples of intangible property claims in service
of business model protection, see eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d
1058, 1060–64, 1069–72 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting motion for injunction based on
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same convergence appeared from the standpoint of intellectual
property law. Patent law suggested explicitly that “business
methods” might be the objects of intellectual property protection,2
even if those methods were not embodied in some technological
form.3 Litigation against Napster and other file-sharing firms and
technologies made explicit the fact that copyright and other forms
of intellectual property law were being used to protect business
models themselves, not merely the works produced and distributed
via the incentives offered by intellectual property law.4
The high tide of patent protection for business methods appears
to be receding,5 and with a decade of e-commerce experience,
distinctions between business methods and their intellectual
property-protected objects have gotten somewhat clearer.6 Peer-to“trespass to chattels” theory where defendant used software robots to search eBay for
current auctions) and Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting effort to enforce patent in “1-Click” website ordering method).
2
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
3
Cf. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1387–88 (B.P.A.I. 2004) (rejecting a
separate “technological arts” test for patentability).
4
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926 (2005) (“In
addition to this evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote further,
the business models employed by Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principal
object was use of their software to download copyrighted works.”). Some scholars
criticized the application of copyright law on precisely this point. See, e.g., Raymond
Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of
Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 267–68 (2002).
5
See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that the Patent Act
“does not allow patents to be issued on particular business systems—such as a particular
type of arbitration—that depend entirely on the use of mental processes”); cf. In re
Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1352-57 (Fed Cir. 2007) (concluding that a transitory signal with
an embedded digital watermark did not constitute patentable subject matter).
6
Apple’s iTunes Music Store, for example, has succeeded phenomenally by
persuading consumers that what they are downloading to their iPods for ninety-nine cents
per song are “copies” of their favorite artists’ works, even though these digital tracks
have little of the inherent durability and reconfigurability of songs delivered on compact
disc, vinyl, or even on cassette tape. That is not to understate the enormous consumer
benefits of the iTunes/iPod ecology. But when they pay for Digital Rights Managementencoded music files housed on tiny, fragile electronic storage devices, even with the
flexibility to burn iTunes downloads to some number of portable disks, consumers aren’t
getting the “things” from iTunes that they may believe that they are getting. Cf.
Christopher Sprigman, The 99¢ Question, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 87, 105–07
(2006) (describing the mismatch between likely consumer expectations and the observed
ninety-nine cents per song pricing scheme).
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peer distribution of music has been reconceptualized as an element
of the ecology of “social production” of various sorts, from the
volunteer-generated “encyclopedia” known as Wikipedia7 to open
source computer software programs. Even if much of the
“business model” dust has settled, and even if “social production”
models for producing creative and innovative works appear to be
capable of supporting stable commercial enterprises,8 a different
sort of uncertainty remains. Today, the propriety of explicitly
building an enterprise on the value of intellectual property created
elsewhere is hotly contested. What is “intellectual property” and
what is “business model” may be clearer than it was a decade ago,
but these two concepts are inextricably linked in evolving cultural
forms.
Pressure to translate those forms into comprehensible legal
frameworks remains high. Consider debates about the viability
and legitimacy of video-sharing websites such as YouTube9 and
searchable online archives such as the Google Books Library
Project.10 Are these enterprises creating legitimate and durable
social value from “spillovers” that always accompany works of
intellectual property?11 Are they unfairly appropriating the returns
on investment by innovators? For my purposes, the question is
whether and how law can help us sort out this distinction.12 What

7

See Wikipedia, http://wikipedia.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (describing the promise of
stable distributed production models).
9
See YouTube – Broadcast Yourself, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Jan. 27,
2008).
10
See Google Books Library Project – An enhanced card catalog of the world’s books,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
11
Cf. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
276–79 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–65 (2005) (both describing the importance of not allowing
creators of intellectual property works to capture all of the social value associated with
those works).
12
Cf. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1641–42 (2007) (describing the limited role of law in the
flourishing of the software industry, despite fears that software patenting would suppress
innovation and growth). While Merges argues that other material conditions have been
more important to the durability and flourishing of the software field—for example, the
8
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does thinking about “business models” tell us about how to think
about the relationship between law that structures innovation and
creativity, on the one hand, and other forces and factors that do the
same? And what does thinking about the latter tell us about novel
business model disputes?
II.
In their classic study of the law and economics of copyright
law, William Landes and Richard Posner argued:
[I]t is easy to note particular distortions that copyright law
corrects. Without copyright protection, . . . [t]here would be
increased incentives to create faddish, ephemeral, and otherwise
transitory works because the gains from being first in the market
for such works would be likely to exceed the losses from absence
of copyright protection.13
Landes and Posner argued that copyright law reduces the risks
associated with novelty. By definition, authors and publishers
must share their works in order to make money from them, but
new creative works face an uncertain and potentially
unappreciative audience, and pirates may lurk around the first
corner that the work encounters in the market. Authors and
publishers might respond by investing in fads and making money
via repeatedly looking to a first mover advantage. The law relieves
the pressure to do this by offering copyright protection for creative
works and by making that protection last a meaningful amount of
time.14 This offers an incentive to produce creative works that pay
structure of the investment community and the character of the technology itself—he
notes that certain patent law doctrines remain quite important. Id. at 1642.
13
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 331–32 (1989) (hereinafter Landes & Posner, Copyright Law).
Elsewhere, Landes and Posner make a related but distinct point about the economics of
patent law. In the absence of a patent regime, an inventor would have an incentive to
focus on innovation subject to appropriation via a first mover advantage, and/or to focus
on innovation subject to appropriation via trade secrecy. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–95 (2003).
14
But not too long, and not so long that the copyright owner is indifferent to its
duration. Cf. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in
the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1659–60 (2004) (suggesting that a modest
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off over time, and/or across multiple markets, rather than right
away.
This theoretical observation is incomplete in some obvious
ways—certain copyright-based industries focus obsessively on
early returns, despite those same industries having lobbied
extensively and successfully for expanded copyright protection,15
and long-term durability may be needed in some cases only to
recoup wastefully high costs of production16—but it contains a
kernel of truth. Other things being equal, both society and
intellectual property law do prefer the durable to the faddish.17
The point generalizes from copyright to patent and from the
descriptive to the normative. Other things being equal, law and
public policy should find ways to enable creativity and innovation
delivered via institutions and in forms that are simultaneously
durable and legitimate.18 The durability interest means this:
“maintenance fee” be imposed on registrants of published works, in order to discourage
opportunistic over-claiming of copyright interests).
15
Cf. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE BIG PICTURE: THE NEW LOGIC OF MONEY AND POWER
IN HOLLYWOOD (2005) (discussing the film industry’s emphasis on big theatrical
openings); Edward Jay Epstein, Gross Misunderstanding, SLATE, May 16, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2118819 (arguing that there is a disconnect between public
fetishism over the opening weekend theatrical gross for feature films, on the one hand,
and the actual revenue model that sustains the motion picture industry, which is far more
dependent on non-theatrical channels, on the other).
16
See Sharon Waxman, Studios Rush to Cash in on DVD Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2004, at E1 (describing the “windfall” effect of DVD sales allowing studios to recoup
massive upfront investments).
17
But see STEVEN JOHNSON, EVERYTHING BAD IS GOOD FOR YOU: HOW TODAY’S
POPULAR CULTURE IS ACTUALLY MAKING US SMARTER (2005) (suggesting that there is
value in creative work that plays to the modern audience’s short attention span). I don’t
need to take a position on the normative point here. I only draw attention to the paradox.
In fact, if it helps, I can say that I agree that the law wrongly excludes both the faddish
and what it assumes to be truly durable, and that it does so in both cases for the same
wrong reason—the narrow view of law’s role in enabling these cultural patterns.
18
In numerous ways, copyright law seeks to exclude “transitory” or “nonserious”
works yet simultaneously to enable access to durable, “serious” things and techniques.
Copyright once was considered too important for advertising, a distinction cured in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), and too legitimating for
pornographers. See Ann Bartow, Open Access, Law, Knowledge, Copyrights, Dominance
and Subordination, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 869, 882–83 (2006) (suggesting that
offering copyright protection to pornography encouraged its production). Even today,
important creative fields like clothing design and cuisine exist only in copyright’s
“negative” space, rather than under its positive umbrella. See Kal Raustiala &
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Notwithstanding large differences between copyright and patent,
the two bodies of law share an interest in enabling appropriation in
the long-term by developers and distributors of the new, and by
their successors. Both “Progress of Science and the useful Arts,”
the Constitutional metric for both copyright and patent policy,19
and the Constitutional requirement that grants of exclusive rights
to authors and inventors exist for “limited Times”20 implicitly
emphasize creative and innovative development over the long
term. The Constitutional language highlights the legitimacy
interest as related but distinct. In Constitutional terms, the
legitimacy of an intellectual property-related form or practice can
be measured externally, as it relates to some social understanding
of “Progress.”
I use the phrase “legitimacy” simultaneously to refer to both
this external sense and to legitimacy measured internally, that is,
on the understanding of participants in a cultural form. In both
ways, legitimacy is grounded in accepted social and cultural
practice rather than solely in acknowledgement via formal state
sanction. The legitimacy of a cultural practice is not only a
question of whether it has been blessed by a duly-enacted statute or
a well-behaved judge. Legislators know this, too, even if their
understanding is only implicitly reflected in the law. Both
copyright and patent rely on autonomous cultural forms—
materiality most clearly, which may be expressed in language—
that derive their legitimacy from non-legal sources.
Both
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1762–68 (2006). Copyright’s current requirement
that creative works be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression,” an updating of the
historical requirement that copyright attached only to works that were published, serves
the same purpose. Fixation and/or publication usually implies durability and thus equates
with various forms of social value.
Copyright doctrine, like Landes and Posner’s theory, also embodies the paradox that
some cultural patterns are deemed to be enduring precisely because they are not protected
by the law. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and
Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007) (arguing that §
102(b) of the Copyright Act does more than merely restate the traditional principle that
copyright does not protect “ideas,” but that systems, principles, and methods of operation
are made independently unprotectable and for good reason: so that other authors may use
them).
19
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20
Id.
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copyright and patent are legal constructs attached to the intangible
products of the mind. From the first copyright and patent
legislation, those constructs have depended on materiality—
inherently durable thingness, based on the social and cultural
acceptance of things—to make their effects felt in the world.
Copyright attached to books and other tangible things and now
springs forth only when a “work of authorship” is “fixed in a
tangible medium of expression.”21 A patent exists only when the
protected “invention” is articulated materially in the language of a
proper patent claim.22
III.
Both copyright and patent exclude certain subject matter from
their scope of protection. In other words, they offer incentives for
the production of some things, but not for others. No one may
copyright an “idea” or anything similar to or related to an idea—
such as a fact, system, method, or process.23 No one may patent a
law of nature, scientific principle, mathematical formula, abstract
idea, or artifact found in nature.24 And now, it appears, no one
may patent a method not embodied in some stable technological
form,25 and no one may patent a business method as such, because
such a method is the equivalent of an abstract idea.26
Among the reasons for these exclusions is that ideas and
abstractions both exist and persist without the incentives offered
by intellectual property law.27 No “author” needs copyright
21

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). I make an implicit argument here that patent claims are
material rather than merely conceptual. For more on this point, see Madison, supra note
1, at 383–85.
23
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 360 (1991) (confirming the exclusion of facts and ideas from copyright protection as
a Constitutional matter).
24
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patentable subject matter); In re Comiskey,
499 F.3d 1365, 1374–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (summarizing the Federal Circuit’s current
interpretation of § 101).
25
See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1352–57 (Fed Cir. 2007).
26
See Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1378.
27
See Landes & Posner, Copyright Law, supra note 13, at 349–59 (asserting that given
the relatively nominal cost of developing “ideas,” granting copyright protection would
22
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incentives to produce an “idea,” and no “inventor” needs patent
incentives to produce an “abstract idea.” The scholarly literature
on business methods patents is especially clear on this point.28 The
imperatives of a competitive market economy typically suffice to
motivate firms to develop innovative business models, and the
dynamics of such an economy typically suffice to explain the
persistence of some models and the failure of others.29
The ebb and flow of cultural and technological innovation
make clear, however, that distinctions in practice between “idea”
and “expression,” between “abstract idea” and “invention,” and
between “intellectual property object” and “business model” are
fluid at the least and evanescent at best.
When viewed in light of business models and business
methods, the law’s simultaneous emphasis on the durable and on
the material produces a paradox. Implicit in the basic proposition
of the law and economics of intellectual property, stated elegantly
by Landes and Posner, is that without the incentives offered by the

invite rent-seeking by authors). Other explanations for the distinction are plentiful,
though rarely fully persuasive. “Ideas” in copyright and “laws of nature” or “abstract
ideas” in patent law lack “originality” or “novelty,” and “authors” and “inventors,”
respectively, which is true only under certain contested assumptions about the nature of
each of those concepts. See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of
Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007). Allowing intellectual property
protection for these “ideas” or “abstract ideas” would raise the cost of follow-on
creativity or invention to a degree that society finds unacceptable. Yet that is sometimes
a problem, too, with things that are granted copyright or patent protection. A more
honest justification for subject matter exclusions might involve a declaration that a line
simply has to be drawn, and intellectual property protection is properly invoked when a
“work” (or its counterpart in patent law, an “invention”) has been properly delineated.
See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575,
608–09 (2005).
28
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 277–79 (2000); John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1175 (1999).
29
This is a simplification. Antitrust law and unfair competition law exist to police
certain significant failures of market processes. The law has largely retreated, however,
from the notion that a general law of unfair competition should police those failures with
respect to competition among business models, as such. Compare Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 232–46 (1918) (establishing liability for
misappropriation of plaintiff’s “hot news” by a competitor), with National Basketball
Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (considerably narrowing the
scope of the law of “hot news” misappropriation).
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law, intangible non-rival things—including ideas and business
methods and models—would be under-produced and would not
endure. On the one hand, incentives are needed to produce durable
intangibles. On the other hand, the most durable intangibles yet
devised—“ideas” in copyright law and “abstract ideas” in patent
law—arise and persist without any legal incentive whatsoever.
The law treats the latter as robust, and the former as fragile. How
can this be?
IV.
As my reference to competitive markets suggests, Landes and
Posner give insufficient weight to the role of other social and
cultural influences on the production and distribution of
information and knowledge. I am far from the first person to make
that observation.30 Social norms, networks, and institutional
imperatives sustain models of information production and
distribution. Material conditions do likewise. Narratives and other
conceptual forms of various sorts structure sustainability and
legitimacy. Most of this is well known, though it is not always
well understood or accounted for.31
Often missing in accounts of these other influences, however,
is an account of law itself as a part of them. By diminishing the
role of law in cultural production, law tends to disappear entirely.
That is a mistake. One succinct but less than illuminating way to
put the point is that neither norms nor materiality nor language, nor
any other relevant conceptual or ideological construct, are

30

See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (describing different modes of regulation in cyberspace).
31
Classic works on the sociology of culture largely take legal structures for granted.
See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION (Randal Johnson
ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1993); MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE
(Steven Rendall trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1984) (1974); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). Even the best work on the construction of culture
from the perspective of regulating information and knowledge, JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996) and Benkler, supra note 8, largely propose substituting a new narrative—the
information environment for Boyle and social production for Benkler—for an old one.
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exogenous to the legal system itself.32 Law is often regarded,
wrongly, as the core (or depending on the metaphor, the
foundation—or even the pinnacle) of a system for sustaining
innovation or creativity. In the alternative, law is sometimes
regarded as irrelevant to the functioning of such a system, or as an
influence that is aligned with but independent of social and cultural
forces. That view is equally wrong. What I consider in the rest of
this Essay are some ways in which law and other things intersect to
produce durable and legitimate forms of information production,
distribution, sharing, and exchange. Instead of viewing the law of
“ideas” and the law of “invention” or “creativity” as distinct, I
view them as integrated with each other and with a host of other
considerations.
I illustrate the point via examples drawn not from the world of
business and business models, and not from industrial processes,
file sharing, peer production, or open source software, but from
some slices of Americana—the persistent, shared objects and
experiences that we use to define ourselves as creators and
consumers of American culture, that is, as American citizens.33
Business is a form of culture. For my purposes, figuring out why
business models and methods evolve and persist is no different in
principle from figuring out why any cultural practice or form
evolves and persists. Sociologists, anthropologists, economists,
and historians have struggled for decades to figure out where
culture comes from and why it sticks around. I cannot end their
struggle. I can, however, illustrate the role of law in constructing
some of the ostensibly “non-legal” or “extra-legal” influences on
the problem. And so long as I get to choose some examples, I
32

Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 217, 219 (1993) (arguing that market preferences are endogenous to existing legal
policy, including the setting of legal entitlements).
33
Julie Cohen writes:
What makes the network good can only be defined by generating
richly detailed ethnographies of the experiences the network enables
and the activities it supports, and articulating a normative theory to
explain what is good, and worth preserving, about those experiences
and activities. To say that the network is us is to say that the network
is the sum of the experiences and actions of its individual, situated
users, and of the patterns and flows that their interactions create.
Julie E. Cohen, Network Stories, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 92 (2007).
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choose examples that are more fun for a copyright scholar than,
say, potentially patentable tax strategies, which have been the
subject of much recent debate. My examples are three distinct
forms of Americana: The Rocky Horror Picture Show, town bands,
and the blues.
V.
In these reviews of three slices of American culture, I make a
single point. In each case what appears to be a purely “cultural” or
“social” phenomenon, and which therefore sits on the
conventionally “unprotected” side of the intellectual property line,
is sustained indirectly and sometimes directly by legal structures
that feed the material and conceptual processes more typically
characterized as guiding these developments. Stripped of the
jargon, durable cultural forms are typically composed of (material)
communal forms of one sort or another and related (conceptual)
ways of thinking and believing that both bind us to communities
and distinguish individuals within them.34 Law is an inescapable
part of both. Some of those legal structures are housed in
intellectual property law. Others are housed elsewhere.
A. The Rocky Horror Picture Show
The Rocky Horror Picture Show is perhaps the best-known
example of an American cult motion picture.35 The film was
released in 1975 as an adaptation of The Rocky Horror Show, a
stage production that originated two years earlier in London.36 The
movie tells the story of Brad (a priggish Barry Bostwick) and Janet
(a virginal Susan Sarandon), who wander innocently out of a
rainstorm and into the castle occupied by Dr. Frank-N-Furter (Tim
34

How to integrate these two perspectives in law generally is the subject of thoughtful
commentary in George H. Taylor, Derrick Bell’s Narratives as Parables, 31 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 225 (2007). See also Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of
Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641 (David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); George Taylor & Michael J. Madison, Metaphor, Objects, and
Commodities, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141 (2006).
35
THE ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW (20th Century Fox Film Corp. 1975).
36
For a look back at the production, see SCOTT MICHAELS & DAVID EVANS, ROCKY
HORROR: FROM CONCEPT TO CULT (2002).
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Curry), a self-declared “sweet transvestite from Transsexual,
Transylvania,”37 and the oddball members of the Annual
Transylvanian Convention.38 Sex and horror and dining and
dancing ensue, including The Time Warp, the film’s signature
musical number, in a mélange of science fiction, camp, and
Frankenstein-ian themes.
Almost immediately after the initial release of the film,
theatrical audiences adopted and adapted it as an audience
participation phenomenon.39 Midnight showings filled theaters
with people dressing and dancing like the characters on the screen.
“Shadowcasts” emulating the film’s characters appeared on stages
in front of movie screens. A patois of audience repartee or “call
backs” developed, along with a syntax to describe the phenomenon
itself. A person who attended a “performance” of Rocky Horror
for the first time was referred to as a “virgin.” Audience members
brought and used what quickly became a standard repertoire of
props to use or throw during appropriate scenes in the film: toast,
rice, toilet paper, water balloons, or squirt guns.40 There was, in
short, a metanarrative of participation keyed to the narrative on the
screen.
From a sociological point of view, all of this is mildly
interesting as examples of cult and ritual (specifically, the
socialization and identity-formation processes that constitute
audience participation groups) and social and textual narratives
(the content of the film, and the routinized audience responses)
oriented to a focal object (the film), a specific place (the theater),
and a specific time (midnight).41

37

In the relatively plotless domain of the film, Transsexual is a planet located in the
galaxy Transylvania.
38
See, e.g., Bill Henkin, THE ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW BOOK (1979).
39
See Anna Quindlen, Midnights at ‘Rocky Horror,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1979, at C1;
Sal Piro, CREATURES OF THE NIGHT: THE ROCKY HORROR EXPERIENCE (1990); The Rocky
Horror Picture Show cult following, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The_Rocky_Horror_Picture_Show_cult_following (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
40
See SAL PIRO & MICHAEL HESS, THE OFFICIAL ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW
AUDIENCE PAR-TIC-I-PATION GUIDE (1991).
41
See JEFFREY WEINSTOCK, THE ROCKY HORROR PICTURE Show (2007); Patrick T.
Kinkade & Michael A. Katovich, Toward a Sociology of Cult Films: Reading “Rocky
Horror,” 33 SOC. Q. 191 (1992); Liz Locke, “Don’t Dream It, Be It”: The Rocky Horror
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Far more interesting for my purposes is that both cult and ritual
persist more than thirty years after the film’s initial release. Many
of the adolescents who remember attending Rocky Horror
screenings as teenagers and college students are old enough to
return—as I did in August 2007—with their own teenage children.
The general cultural and social sensibilities of America have
changed dramatically since the late 1970s, when the Rocky Horror
phenomenon first evolved. Much of the identity-challenging,
transgressive character of the film itself and of audience
participation has evaporated in the mists of changing social mores.
Yet the theatrical version of the film remains in release. Midnight
showings still occur. Teenagers and college students (and others)
fill theaters while dressed in character, shadowing the characters
on the screen, yelling “call backs,” dancing the Time Warp,
anointing “virgins,” and throwing toast. The film spawned
institutionalized “casts” of audience performers, who organize and
manage midnight showings and conventions.42
Since
videocassettes and DVDs of the film have become available for
rental and now purchase, midnight “showings” of the film now
take place in basements and family rooms where groups of friends
“perform” in costume and with props.43
Framed in the way that Landes and Posner suggested, the
persistence of the Rocky Horror phenomenon is a curious thing.
The audience participation phenomenon, indeed the entire Rocky
Horror culture, may have begun as a fad. But it quickly took
shape and became a durable “work,” to borrow the copyright term,
notwithstanding the fact that aside from the film itself, intellectual
property law had almost nothing to do with it. The Rocky Horror
example therefore suggests the obvious: Landes and Posner are no

Picture Show as Cultural Performance, NEW DIRECTIONS IN FOLKLORE, May–July 1999,
http://www.temple.edu/isllc/newfolk/rhps1.html.
42
For more information, see the Official Rocky Horror Fan Site,
http://www.rockyhorror.com, and the site for the Rocky Horror Preservation Foundation,
http://www.rhpf.org. Links to Rocky Horror “casts” are available at The Ultimate Rocky
Horror Links page, http://www.midnightmadness.org/ultimatelink.htm (all sites last
visited Oct. 22, 2007).
43
There is no way to know the breadth of the basement phenomenon, but I know that it
happens. High school seniors in my suburban community were extolled for their Rocky
Horror performances in a recent yearbook.
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sociologists. The audience participation phenomenon sustains
itself via both material and conceptual dimensions of classic
ritual.44 Moreover, to the extent that the film was a fad in the first
place, that, too, modestly undercuts their thesis. If copyright was
designed to promote culturally durable creative works, in this case
it produced a faddish film. The film in turn prompted a durable
phenomenon, though apparently not for reasons related to
copyright. Fans appropriated the film and made it what it is
today.45
Law, however, should not be cast aside altogether. The foci of
ritual analysis, the “things” at the center of the action, cannot be
taken for granted. If The Rocky Horror Picture Show, with
audience participation, is a durable cultural practice, much of that
durability may be traced to copyright—but in ways not described
by Landes and Posner. In this case, copyright enables both author
and audience to maintain and reflect on the stable identity of the
work of authorship itself.46 Audience participation in particular
and fandom in general exist in symbiosis with the objects of fans’
attention. Those objects are created and conserved via legal
mechanisms as well as via ritual.47 The fact that Rocky Horror
both is available for continuing theatrical release and remains in
wide distribution via videocassette and DVD, is clearly related to
its status as a copyrighted work of authorship.48 The different
copyright interests at stake can be examined independently, from
44

It is possible to get too serious about this possibility. See Amittai F. Aviram,
Postmodern Gay Dionysus: Dr. Frank N. Furter, 26 J. POPULAR CULTURE 183 (1992)
(“[T]he Rocky Horror Picture Show centers . . . around the divine itself.”).
45
For analysis of the interaction between creative fandom subcultures and copyright
law, see Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007).
46
See generally Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) (arguing that copyright should recognize
audience interests in stable cultural meanings of copyrighted works).
47
While I focus on copyright, other law-based mechanisms for conserving ritualized
objects have been invoked. The Librarian of Congress added The Rocky Horror Picture
Show to the National Film Registry in 2005, “a status that will ensure its long-term
preservation as a film whose significance will be recognized for generations to come.”
Library of Congress, Saving “Rocky Horror” . . . and Other Classics,
http://www.loc.gov/wiseguide/feb06/horror.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
48
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2006) (classifying “motion pictures” as “works of
authorship”).
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the standpoint of the copyright owner and from the standpoint of
the film’s fans.
From the copyright owner’s standpoint, the copyright in the
work will last for a good long time to come.49 The owner of the
copyright has the exclusive right to distribute the film in copies,50
as it has done here and as it continues to do. The owner has the
exclusive right to control public performances,51 as it has done
here by exercising its right to license exhibition of the film. From
the copyright owner’s perspective, audience shadowcasting of the
film may constitute either preparation of an (unfixed) derivative
work or a public performance of the work. If so, the case, then the
theatrical audience phenomenon surrounding Rocky Horror is the
product of a consensual arrangement between producer and fans
supported implicitly and conceptually by copyright. The copyright
owner has the right to control production of derivative works;52
shadowcast producers may be the beneficiaries of implied licenses
to create them. There is no suggestion that that the owner of the
film’s copyright has tried to stop or to license fan-based theatrical
performances. In fact, the copyright owner benefits handsomely
from licensing terms that base royalties on a percentage of gross
sales. The owner has likewise at least implicitly accepted the
legitimacy of an abundance of fan-based websites, books, and fan
fiction, when copyright law might have sustained suits to enjoin
them.
Moreover, the intersection of profit imperatives and copyright
law means the integrity of the original work has been largely
preserved by the copyright owner, and that the original film
remains available and accessible to the public. As noted already,
the film is available for theatrical viewing. The film was released
on videocassette in 1990 and on DVD in 2000 as a twenty-fifth
anniversary two-disc edition, priming the pump for new ritualists.53

49

See id. §§ 302–05 (establishing the duration of a copyright for works depending on
their date of creation and/or publication).
50
Id. § 106(3).
51
Id. § 106(4).
52
See id. § 106(2).
53
The distribution history of Rocky Horror is recounted at The Rocky Horror Picture
Show, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rocky_Horror_Picture_Show (last
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An authorized sequel, Shock Treatment, was released in 198154
(when the original Rocky Horror phenomenon was well
established), but it flopped, suggesting that unauthorized sequels
would likely fare no better. If another sequel or a remake has been
discussed,55 no projects have come to fruition. At this point, it is
difficult to conceive of a more foolish business strategy than to
“remake” Rocky Horror.56
From the standpoint of the Rocky Horror fan, copyright
reasoning takes a slightly different path but arrives largely at the
same conclusion. The law secures access to the thing that is at the
center of the cultural practice. Audience participation and
shadowcasting the film in theaters may be noninfringing uses of
the work, because they do not constitute a “performance” of the
film or preparation of a derivative work at all. Shadowcasters
don’t repeat the lines from the film. Audience members are
responding to the film, not emulating it. Even if the audience
experience were found formally to trip the wires of Section 106,
the so-called “derivative” performance in question likely strikes
many people intuitively as the kind of non-threatening enjoyment
of a work of authorship that should be either treated as fair use57 or
excluded from the scope of the copyright owner’s rights in the first
place.58 Having licensed exhibition of the film, the copyright
owner has little ground for protest if fans dress in character and get
up and dance in the aisles. Of course, theater owners might protest
if they have to sweep up the breadcrumbs and rice, and today, at
least some owners prohibit the water pistols and water balloons
visited Nov. 30, 2007) and at The Rocky Horror Picture Show, IMDb,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0073629/alternateversions (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
54
See Shock Treatment, The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0083067/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
55
News tidbits to this effect occasionally percolate through Internet message boards.
See, e.g., Posting of Jeff Kleist to http://www.hometheaterforum.com/htf/
showthread.php?t=68176 (Oct. 22, 2007, 12:43 EST) (noting an upcoming announcement
of a television remake of Rocky Horror).
56
One might ask why. From the standpoint of the Rocky Horror fan phenomenon, the
question is whether a remake or a new sequel would reinforce the existing ritual and
community, or disrupt it. My imaginary money is on the latter.
57
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
58
See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007) (arguing that
copyright includes a principle of non-infringing personal use).
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that were an integral part of early performances. Fans’ access to
the film—the ritualized focal object—is secured by copyright in a
second way. Fans who buy copies of the videocassette or DVD of
Rocky Horror can gather friends and show the movie privately (in
copyright terms, this is “performing” the audiovisual work),
without implicating any of the copyright owner’s rights under the
Copyright Act.59 If recording a broadcast television program in
your home and watching it later on a VCR doesn’t infringe the
rights of copyright owners,60 then it is difficult to imagine
infringement arising from the private playback of the film, even
accompanied by lewd costumes and The Time Warp.
The distinction between these two interpretations, while subtle
in terms of the pragmatics of the Rocky Horror ritual, is more than
a matter of legal arcana. Legally, if audience practice is construed
as a matter of implied license and tolerated use, the copyright
owner has the authority to change course and shut down the
practice or assert claims to royalties.61 That possibility seems
remote. But socially and culturally, it means that the copyright
owner and the audience co-exist in a certain dynamic tension, each
responding to the other as well as to the film itself. The owner
allows the audience a degree of freedom. Audience response
assures the owner a return that encourages continued access. A
construction that frees the audience from the scope of the copyright
owner’s legal claims gives the practice a different character. Its
durability and legitimacy are more substantial than they would be
under the construction that emphasizes toleration by the copyright
owner. The scope, depth, and continuity of audience response is
framed internally, by the audience itself, rather than partially
externally, by the implicit copyright claim. Neither construction is
inherently “better” than the other as a matter of the durability of
the practice, but the two versions offer distinct trajectories.

59

The Copyright Act only grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to perform the
work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
60
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
61
Possible claims for equitable relief would be subject to a laches defense, at the very
least, in addition to standard fair use arguments.
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B. Town Bands
It may be difficult to imagine Landes and Posner
contemplating the copyright implications of The Rocky Horror
Picture Show, so perhaps a tamer example of Americana illustrates
equally well the complexity lurking in their simple observation
about what intellectual property law does and does not aim to
produce. I draw out explicitly some things that the Rocky Horror
example leaves implicit and then add a new layer of analysis. The
example is the American town band. Not long after I attended a
recent theatrical “performance” of The Rocky Horror Picture
Show, on the other side of the country I participated in a cultural
ritual of longer standing. I attended a performance of the Chatham
town band on a summer evening in Chatham, Massachusetts, on
Cape Cod.
The town band in Chatham has been performing free concerts
on Friday nights in July and August for roughly seventy years.
The band plays on a bandstand in a park in the center of town.
Families stroll by during the day and reserve their spaces on the
lawn with blankets and folding chairs. By the time the concert
starts, the park is full and abuzz with several generations of
Chatham residents and vacationers. The band is an all-volunteer
group. The repertoire focuses on band classics: Sousa and other
marches, “patriotic” standards, songs for young children (Old
MacDonald, etc.), and the occasional show tune or classic Disney
musical number.
In almost every respect, the Chatham Band is a throwback to
the late nineteenth century, when having a band was almost a
requirement of being a town and bands and other musical groups
were indispensable to the identities of local communities organized
around nationality and ethnicity.62 In many parts of the country,
62

On the history of town bands in the United States, see MARGARET HINDLE HAZEN &
ROBERT M. HAZEN, THE MUSIC MEN (1987); KENNETH KREITNER, DISCOURSING SWEET
MUSIC: TOWN BANDS AND COMMUNITY LIFE IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY PENNSYLVANIA
(Univ. of Ill. Press 1990); Paula Savaglio, Polka Bands and Choral Groups: The Musical
Self-Representation of Polish-Americans in Detroit, 40 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 35 (1996);
NEW ENGLAND MUSIC: THE PUBLIC SPHERE, 1600–1900, ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
DUBLIN SEMINAR FOR NEW ENGLAND FOLKLIFE (1996). In a recent article tracing the
emergence of music as a form of recognizable property, Michael Carroll traces the
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all that remains of this musical tradition is the high school
marching band, though the Chatham Band is hardly alone as a
survivor, especially in New England.63 The intriguing question
here is similar to the question that I raised above in connection
with Rocky Horror. Why is the Chatham Band still performing,
when similar bands all around the country have disappeared and its
repertoire is not, let us say, au courant? There is, after all, nothing
proprietary in the band or its method, and little proprietary in its
selection of music. Landes and Posner might predict that to sustain
the cultural form, some form of exclusive right might be required,
and they again might be (modestly) surprised to note that the
Chatham Band flourishes without any visible help from the legal
system.
As I noted earlier, sociologists know better than to assume that
the legal system makes practices durable, but as I also noted
before, even sociologists ought not to overlook certain features of
the legal system lurking in the background. The continuity of the
Chatham Band depends, in important ways, on law. I could focus
on the objects of the Chatham ritual, that is, the musical works that
the band plays. Much of its public domain repertoire was once
copyrighted, and owners of works still in copyright would be
entitled to royalties but for the presence of Section 110(4) of the
Copyright Act, which exempts these performances from the
owners’ exclusive rights.64 The performances are therefore
inexpensive to produce. But Section 110(4) would apply to any
town or community band that performs free concerts for local

community band phenomenon back to 13th and 14th century Europe. See Michael W.
Carroll, Whose Music is it Anyway?: How We Came to View Musical Expression as a
Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1446–47 (2004).
63
For example, the Kansas State Historical Society maintains an online exhibit on town
bands that refers to their persistence in some communities. They’re Playing Our Song:
Community Bands in Kansas, Kansas State Historical Society, http://www.kshs.org/
exhibits/bands/bands2.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
64
17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2006). This section applies only so long as the performance is
not commercial in character and is not transmitted (by radio or television, for example),
so long as no direct or indirect admission charge is imposed, and so long as the
performers, organizers, and sponsors receive no fees for their involvement. As is often
the case with copyright legislation, this paraphrase does not quite capture all of the
nuances of the statute.
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citizens. Why has the Chatham Band persisted when so many
others have not?
There are a couple of things at work here that are also at work
in the Rocky Horror example, though I didn’t draw them out
above. Both cultural practices feature a continuing and a palpable
sense of engagement by a group of insiders and a relatively salient
boundary that marks the existence of the group. In the Rocky
Horror setting, some of that boundary is marked by language.
New initiates are “virgins.” Some of it comes from knowledge of
the specific expectations of audience participation. And some of it
emerges—as I implied with the reference above to home
videotaping—from the fact that Rocky Horror performances take
place in places that are treated, both socially and legally, as
private.65 In Chatham, that palpable sense of the group is not
constructed by a legal regime that marks a home or a rented movie
theater as a private space. Instead, that group sense comes from the
reverse, equally steeped in legal structures: from the fact that band
performances are public.
The Chatham Band plays today on the Whit Tileston
Bandstand in Kate Gould Park, just off of Main Street in
Chatham’s modest central shopping district. Both the bandstand
and the park are owned and maintained by the Town of Chatham,66
that is, both are public property, and the park itself is open and
accessible to all. The Bandstand is named for the long-time leader
of the band, who reportedly was responsible for institutionalizing
the band in the years after World War II,67 and it was originally
built, according to one report, in response to a local fundraising
drive initiated by the cry, “This band is too big for this little
bandstand!”68 The shallow hollow that constitutes the park where
the bandstand sits is almost perfectly sized in proportion to the
structure and to the size of the crowd that turns out, and it is
literally a stone’s throw from the heart of the town’s Main Street.
65
See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2008) (emphasizing the spatial dimensions of privacy).
66
See Nancy Barr, Chatham Band Concerts, http://www.capecodtravelguide.com/
chatham-band-concerts.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
67
Id.
68
Id.
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The site of the concerts has long offered an almost ideal
coordination point for the community.69 The practice of depositing
blankets and chairs and ultimately the size of the crowd reflect the
concerts’ continuing role in summertime Chatham. Hundreds of
people turn out to hear the music and to waltz and bunny-hop on
the grass—though of course they don’t waltz and bunny-hop at the
same time, at least not as a matter of course.
The name of the bandstand bears comment as well. Continuity
of the band’s leadership during the latter half of the twentieth
century was essential to the band’s durability. When the
bandleader died, naming the bandstand after him may have been a
masterstroke. While the name is far from salient in the minds of
the town’s younger residents and visitors, for long-timers—and
there are many in Chatham—the name likely sustains the cultural
tradition nearly as well as the bandleader himself might have. And
the act of naming at least implicitly involved a bit of right-ofpublicity jujitsu.
In other words, here again is a symbiotic relationship among
law, social structure, object, and place, which resembles in broad
outline the symbiosis evident on the surface of the Rocky Horror
phenomenon. A focal object and a focal place in both contexts
offer a relatively stable referent. In both there is a continuing
group dynamic to engage with that focus that allows for both
continuity and adaptation in the practice itself. The group comes
together for a given performance; a related but distinct group
comes together for the next. Law structures the focus. It
privileges or protects what is alternatively the private or public
character of the group.
Are the persistence of the Chatham Band and its place in the
traditions of Chatham, Massachusetts any more specifically based
on any kind of law, let alone intellectual property law, than Rocky
Horror is specifically dependent on copyright? As I noted in the
Rocky Horror context, what are the sources of the durability and

69

For discussions of the “focal point” theory of legal legitimacy, see THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–71 (1980); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Robert Sugden, A Theory
of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533 (1995).
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legitimacy of the practice? One cannot tell for sure. Nor is the
Chatham Band any more unique as a contemporary town band than
is Rocky Horror as a contemporary cult film. In both settings,
however, a dialogue among author and performer and context and
audience, over a period of years, has created and sustained a form
of American culture supported by specific legal structures. In
Chatham, the band might have performed in a high school
auditorium, or in a church. The band might have collected
donations or sold raffle tickets to offset expenses. Subtle
variations might trigger different application of the copyright rule
applicable to the band’s public performances, perhaps pushing its
repertoire more clearly toward public domain material and
potentially distancing the band from younger audience members.70
Each of these variations likely would have shaped the history and
durability of the institution in unpredictable but distinct ways, and
in ways that conventional copyright distinctions between “idea”
and “expression,” and the incentives required to produce each of
them, fail to capture. If those forms of culture persist for the long
run, then that persistence owes a debt to the law. That debt is not
necessarily repaid as Landes and Posner would hypothesize, that
is, through the construction of intellectual property rights. The
Chatham Band depends in large part on an important and
accessible place, on a community’s sense of place, and on a place
that is specified, owned, and managed by the relevant public
authority.
C. The Blues
My third and final example illustrates that point by adding yet
another distinct piece to the puzzle of durable culture: the blues.71
“The blues” as an American musical tradition goes back well over
a century, extending even beyond the United States to West
African musical traditions that were adopted and extended during
slavery. Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
70

Many young children respond to Disney “standards,” such as songs from MARY
POPPINS (Walt Disney Productions 1964).
71
This is both necessary and inevitable. As the great guitarist Albert Collins said in a
forgettable film called Adventures in Babysitting, “Nobody leaves this place without
singing the blues.” ADVENTURES IN BABYSITTING (Buena Vista Pictures 1987).
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centuries, blues-based music grew in complexity and influence, but
largely via performance tradition distributed through communities
by personal contact and oral (and aural) practice. By the time
blues derivatives—rock ‘n’ roll, rhythm ‘n blues, jazz—began to
get commercialized and popularized in the 1950s and 1960s, the
intellectual property-based blues narrative was well underway.
The true originators of the blues rarely inscribed their work in the
fixed forms that copyright law had come to expect, and when they
encountered the commercial music business, they were harshly
exploited.72 The blues endures today not because of intellectual
property law, but (apparently) despite it.
In the blues, I’ve chosen a musical genre and a cultural
tradition rather than a specific work (Rocky Horror) or institution
(the Chatham Band), and so my analytic ground has shifted
somewhat. Unlike either of these things, the blues has a wellknown and well-trod cultural and musical history,73 centered on
African and African-American communities and based musically
on the guitar and repetition, reuse, and adaptation of a simple
twelve-bar I-IV-V chord pattern. That foundation lessens the
burden of explaining what “the blues” is. But the underlying
question remains largely the same: If intellectual property law is so
important to the production of durable forms of culture, how can
the blues have endured—how can it persist even today—despite its
seeming exclusion from copyright? A simple chord pattern is a
paradigmatic, unprotected “idea” from a copyright perspective.
Blues performances that are fixed neither in recorded form nor via
musical notation, don’t satisfy copyright’s subject matter
requirements. As I asked above, what are the sources of its
72

Well-known examples of early blues artists securing attribution and compensation
from rock ‘n’ roll musicians who appropriated their work include Willie Dixon suing Led
Zeppelin over Whole Lotta Love in 1985 and John Lee Hooker suing ZZ Top over La
Grange. See La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 1995). For a
discussion of the Dixon case in the context of a thought-provoking review of the
intersection of music copyright and the blues tradition, see generally Keith Aoki,
Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference
to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 755–72 (2007).
73
See, e.g., WILLIAM BARLOW, “LOOKING UP AT DOWN”: THE EMERGENCE OF BLUES
CULTURE (Temple Univ. Press 1989); LEROI JONES, BLUES PEOPLE (Harper Perennial
1999); ALBERT MURRAY, STOMPIN’ THE BLUES (Da Capo 1989); ROBERT PALMER, DEEP
BLUES (Penguin 1982).
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durability and legitimacy? Does intellectual property law get the
blues?
It does, and in a way that requires a brief excursion not into
ritual foci or ritual locations (though in the guitar and in Chicago,
the blues arguably has both), but into the musical practices that
constitute the blues and how copyright law has traditionally read
on them. Keith Aoki’s recent discussion of the blues, as an
example of the complex interaction of distributive justice
principles and copyright law, leads the way:
While it may seem unfortunate or unjust that certain
musical genres remained legally unprotected, the
lack of protection for un-notated musical works
may have given rise to significant “internal”
creative hybridization and cross-fertilization that
might not have otherwise occurred. In this instance,
“internal” refers to creative practices within the
black community or black musical sub-communities
wherein musicians borrowed from and incorporated
elements from each other’s work. In the process,
new musical idioms emerged that might not have
arisen within a clearly delineated and regulated IP
[intellectual property] landscape.74
Siva Vaidhyanathan likewise emphasizes the productive
tension in the blues between repetition and redundancy, on the one
hand, and innovation, on the other, and how blues artists
communicated with one another and with their audiences via
performance rather than via static objects—recordings or sheet
music.75 Intellectual property law sustained the blues not via what
the law embraced, but via what the law excluded.76 At almost
every level of abstraction, the law sees in the blues not the concrete
74

Aoki, supra note 72, at 760.
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 117–26 (2001).
76
See generally Carroll, supra note 62; Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music
Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907 (2005) (in research on the intersection of music history
and property law, focusing principally on how the law brought music within its scope,
rather than on how the law excluded music); cf. Candace G. Hines, Note, Black Musical
Traditions and Copyright Law: Historical Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463 (2005)
(arguing that black musical forms survived despite their exclusion from copyright).
75
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and protectable, but the general and the unprotectable. Individual
notes and chords are “facts”; chord progressions are “ideas”
necessary to expression within the genre; full improvisations and
performances are not fixed. Repetition of rhythms, riffs, and even
melodies does not constitute “originality” or “authorship” in a
copyright sense. Learning the rudiments of these things is cheap
and easy. In theory, anyone can become a blues musician.
The openness of the blues tradition should not be overstated.
The musical dynamism implicit in those characterizations exists in
tension with attention to stability and authenticity.77 Blues
journalists, blues fans, long-time blues musicians, and proprietors
of record labels and clubs all enforce rough adherence to the
concept of “the blues,” simultaneously and rhetorically an iconic
but unowned thing and a persistent narrative of how certain music
is created and embraced.78 The name itself distills a dynamic
tradition into a phrase that denotes “inside” and “outside” the
cultural form. You either have (or get) the blues, or you don’t.
Both the blues and our cultural understanding of the blues are
matters of character and continuing conversations, conceptual
constructs paired with the materiality of the music itself. Keith
Aoki asks, “Who owns the blues?,” and the traditional answer must
be “no one,”79 in the sense that no one can own a method—that is,
a narrative of cultural production—and no one can own oneself.80
Even in the absence of traditional ownership, the blues consists of
something fixed and embodied. One resolution offered by Aoki is
that both law and culture construct a limited “commons” of artistic
resources that blues artists can contribute to and draw on without
fear of legal penalty81—a persistent but metaphoric place that

77

Plenty of blues artists have emerged in recent years to claim compensation and/or
attribution based on misappropriation of their work. Not all have succeeded. See, e.g.,
Ory v. McDonald, 141 F. App’x 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant Country Joe McDonald, accused of misappropriating
“Muskrat Ramble” in connection with his “Fixin’ to Die Rag”).
78
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 75, at 120 (blues), 138 (rap).
79
See Aoki, supra note 72, at 755–72.
80
See Samuelson, supra note 18.
81
See Aoki, supra note 72, at 768.

MADISON_022508_FINAL

702

2/25/2008 7:19:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

serves as a legally-managed counterpart to the places and spaces in
the Rocky Horror and town band examples.82
Law itself manages that status. The final point of this example
is that even subtle changes in the law can change the cultural
dynamic by sustaining, disrupting, and/or modifying the tradition.
Law can simultaneously differentiate and ratify a cultural form,
and redirect it. Landes and Posner suggested that intellectual
property law encourages the production of durable cultural goods
that otherwise would be undersupplied.83 In the examples sketched
so far, I’ve tried to briefly identify ways in which law serves an
important but indirect role in constructing sustainable cultural
practices. A more accurate revision of that proposition identifies
places where intellectual property law changes cultural trajectories.
In the context of the blues, at least three times legal intervention
redirected the arc of the blues and its descendants. The first was
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,84 in which a
district court determined that a musician could infringe an earlier
composition via “subconscious” copying.85 The second was
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.,86
concluding that any sampling of a musical recording by a rap artist
violated not only the Copyright Act, but also the Biblical
injunction against theft.87 The third was Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films,88 which concluded that any sampling of a
copyrighted sound recording—even a single, three-note chord—
could trigger copyright infringement.89 In the first two of these

82

A different resolution is exemplified by Willie Dixon, who released an album in
1970 titled I Am the Blues. “Place” and “ownership” of the blues are literal and physical
as well as metaphorical. As if anticipating this Article, the owners of the nightclub chain
“House of Blues” filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in early October 2007 against
the owners of an unaffiliated “House of Blues” establishment in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
HOB Entm’t Inc. v. House of Blues Baton Rouge, LLC, No. 07-0727, complaint filed
(M.D. La. filed Oct. 9, 2007).
83
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
84
420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
Harrisongs, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
85
Id. at 181.
86
780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
87
Id. at 183.
88
410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
89
See id. at 798.
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developments, Siva Vaidhyanathan sees a struggle in the music
industry between the old and established and the new and
emerging.90 It is equally noteworthy that seemingly minor changes
in the law, when expressed across a cultural practice, produce
changes in the nature of the cultural practice itself, changes that
cannot be easily characterized as “good” or “bad” or as favoring
the new or the old. The law has reshaped the metaphoric musical
commons.
Rules regarding membership, contribution, and
withdrawal have been changed. As all music “samples” must be
cleared rather than simply borrowed, and as music composition
and production stresses “originality” and “novelty” over re-use of
the old, traditional blues forms are extinguished as they morph
through contemporary forms of rap and hip-hop.91 They are
simultaneously differentiated and preserved.92 Durability and
legitimacy turn out to be dynamic and blended things.
VI.
The point of these three samples of Americana is not that
Landes and Posner were wrong, but that they were right in ways
that their work does not acknowledge. Intellectual property law
does play an important role in creating cultural forms and practices
and helping them become simultaneously durable and legitimate.
But it does so not simply by supplying or withdrawing incentives
to produce durable cultural goods. Those same sources of law can
disable and disrupt cultural forms. In fact, as the blues example
illustrates, under some circumstances intellectual property and
related law does more to encourage cultural durability when it
90

VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 75, at 117–26.
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 640–44 (2006) (suggesting
compulsory licensing as a solution to clearance problems for sampling in hip hop).
92
See, e.g., Sasha Frere Jones, A Paler Shade of White, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 22,
2007, at 176, 181 (arguing that pressure to be “original” in developing new music has led
to a decrease in borrowing and reuse of old themes, to a racial Balkanization of the music
industry, but has been accompanied by increased financial independence for black artists
and producers and by “democratization” of musical traditions); Will Hermes, Rocky’s
Balkanized Route to the Indies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, § AR2, at 26 (noting the
influence of musical genres and styles from around the world on American “independent”
music).
91
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chooses not to protect cultural products. Law plays a role in
constructing and deconstructing the places, objects, narratives, and
metaphors93 that allow communities to form, persist, and evolve.
And this context-specific “how” of the law matters enormously.
Culturally as well as legally, there is a subtle but important
difference between implicitly licensed consumer engagement with
The Rocky Horror Picture Show and the unregulated exercise of
consumer imagination, between privately-owned and publiclyowned spaces for town bands and fan participation, and between
narratives of performative imitation and clearing samples in
African-American music.
Consider this proposition in a different light, applied
prospectively rather than retrospectively, and its relevance in the
context of business models becomes clear. At the intersection of
business models and intellectual property is the same question
about sustainability that I used to frame brief reviews of
Americana. Intellectual property law adopts a misleading duality:
Cultural forms on the “expression” side of the line are relatively
fragile and require legal incentives for their production. Cultural
forms on the “idea” side of the line are relatively robust and
require no such incentives. Having discarded that duality and
focused instead on the “how” of the law in the context of cultural
durability, what lessons can be applied to business model
problems? How can sensitivity to the nuances of law’s role help
society build durable and legitimate business models?
This can be worked out only via examples. Among novel
intellectual property-based business models, we have some
benchmarks—models that law has directly and indirectly declared
to be illegitimate and has worked hard to destabilize, and
apparently durable models that law has helped to validate. In the
former camp are businesses built around peer-to-peer file-sharing
software directed to entertainment content (music and film). The
Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd.94—condemning the distributors of the Grokster
software for having “induced” copyright infringement—was
93

See Taylor, supra note 34, at 265 (arguing that narrative and metaphor are forms of
materiality).
94
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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framed by a narrative that equated alleged “sharing” of musical
recordings with stealing them, and by a robust sense of the objectstatus of the recordings themselves.95 In the latter is the marketleading business for music and movie downloading, Apple’s
iTunes Music Store.96 In Apple’s case, not only does ninety-ninecents-per-track pricing give the service an incomparable ease of
use, but iTunes operates at the center of a cluster of contractual and
technological constraints and enabling devices all protected by
various legal rules.97
The next step is to consider intellectual property-dependent
business models whose durability and legitimacy are contested.
One example might be YouTube, the online video-sharing service
now owned by Google that is the central problem in debates about
legal frameworks for “User Generated Content” or UGC.98 A
second might be Google Book Search, the shorthand term for a
cluster of initiatives also undertaken by Google that involve
digitizing mass numbers of books and making all or part of them
available via a specialized online search interface.99 YouTube
users, who often use the service to post and distribute videos of
clipped or remixed copyrighted content, prompt allegations that the
site is no different than Grokster, a business model predicated on
theft of others’ intellectual property.100 One obvious way in which
95

Cf. id. Even Justice Breyer’s concurrence, by far the most sympathetic of the
Court’s three opinions to the technology at issue, included the following statement: “And
deliberate unlawful copying is no less an unlawful taking of property than garden-variety
theft.” Id. at 961 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
97
See generally Urs Gasser, iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape
the Business of Digital Media—A Case Study (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at
Harvard Law Sch., Research Publ’n No. 7, 2004-07, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=556802.
98
For one definition of “user-generated content,” see User-generated content,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_generated_content (last visited Nov. 27,
2007).
99
See About Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/
about.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
100
In March 2007, when Viacom launched a $1 billion lawsuit against Google in
connection with YouTube, Viacom released a statement accusing Google of perpetrating
an “unlawful business model” that continues “to steal value from artists.” Press Release,
Viacom, Viacom Files Federal Copyright Infringement Complaint Against YouTube and
Google; Suit Seeks Court Ruling to Require YouTube and Google to Comply With
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copyright law could move to render YouTube use “legitimate” and
YouTube “practice” sustainable is by declaring that YouTube users
are engaging in fair use of copyrighted material. Or a court might
declare that YouTube is protected by a statutory “safe harbor” for
online service providers who host works posted by their users.101
A less obvious mechanism would be indirectly structured by law.
Google is moving to legitimize YouTube in part by developing
“fingerprinting” technology that would “objectify” copyrighted
content to a degree not currently available, potentially allowing
copyright owners to determine that the “thing” posted to YouTube
is the same “thing” that the copyright owner produced (or at least
owns) in the first place.102 Sustained application and enforcement
of the technology likely would involve some detailed examination
and application of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”).103 Whether the “fingerprinting” technology will
“work” as hoped is anyone’s guess. Whether the technology
represents good policy as a solution to the UGC “problem” is a
question for the next and final section of this Essay. Bolstered by
the DMCA, it is clearly designed to stabilize YouTube “practice”
and render it legitimate, and in that sense reveals the subtle role of
law in cultural forms.
Google Book Search presents its own set of challenges. Via
the Google Books Library Project, of which Google Book Search
is a part, Google has declared its intention to create an “enhanced”
catalog of all of the world’s books and a digital archive of the text
of those books, including works still in copyright, made available

Copyright Laws and Pay $1 Billion in Damages (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.viacom.com/news/News_Docs/Viacom Press Release.pdf; see also Viacom
Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 CV 2103 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/3021
64/1/; Miguel Helft & Geraldine Fabrikant, WhoseTube? Viacom Sues Google Over
Video Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C1; Viacom will sue YouTube for $1bn, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 13, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6446193.stm.
101
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
102
See Miguel Helft, Google Takes Step on Video Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2007, at C7.
103
See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (2006) (providing cause of action for removal or alteration
of “copyright management information”).
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selectively to online searchers.104 Only books in the public domain
or accompanied by the owners’ permission are made available in
full-text form.105 The remainder are available only via short
“snippets”—though the entirety of each work is stored somewhere
at Google.106 As with YouTube and UGC, I reserve judgment on
the wisdom of the project for the last Section of the Essay. Here
the question is how law might contribute to its sustainability and
legitimacy. Google faces challenges from copyright owners, who
object to uncompensated “taking” of their works, from libraries
that would like to participate in the program but who are aggrieved
by Google’s licensing terms, and from users and librarians who
have raised concerns about the privacy interests of Google
“patrons.”107 All of the quotation marks in that sentence signify
the complexity of the undertaking not only from a legal
perspective, but also from a cultural perspective. Can the project
be built to last and rendered both legally and culturally legitimate?
As with YouTube, fair use might intervene to protect either the
end-users of Google’s service—and thus protect Google under
what remains of the Sony rule of indirect liability108—or Google
itself, on the ground that it is producing only “intermediate” copies
of copyrighted works in order to enable genuine “fair use” by end-

104

See Google Books Library Project – An enhanced card catalog of the world’s books,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
105
Google Book Search: What you’ll see when you search on Google Book Search,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/screenshots.html#fullview (last visited Nov. 6,
2007)
106
Id.
107
See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of
Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1219–21 (2007) (describing the importance of
librarians and librarianship in moderating privacy and privatization problems arising from
the Google Library Project); Katie Hafner, Libraries Shun Deals to Place Books on Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2007, at A1.
108
The Supreme Court issued three opinions in the Grokster case, all of them
concluding that Grokster was liable for copyright infringement committed by Grokster
users.
All three opinions confirmed the nominal survival of the “substantial
noninfringing use” standard for claims of secondary liability against technology
providers, announced more than than years earlier in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The Court’s recognition of a distinct “inducement” of
infringement threshold in Grokster leaves the viability of Sony open to question. See
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005).
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users.109 Public access and privacy concerns would remain,
however. A less obvious but no less potentially significant role for
law would be to examine the Google Library under antitrust rules
in order to assure public access on nondiscriminatory terms.110 Or,
Google itself might voluntarily constitute the Google Library more
explicitly as a “library”—that is, as a kind of information
commons (in property law terms111) and as the virtual and
metaphoric equivalent to the kind of place for books that has
played an essential social and cultural role for centuries, the world
over.112
VII.
This brief material and conceptual reconstruction of Google
Book Search is speculative, to say the least. Here I bring the
discussion back to ground. This Essay started with business
models, and specifically with problematic distinctions between
business models and the intellectual property interests that feed
them. It concludes with business models. Landes and Posner
argued that intellectual property rules are necessary to assure the
production of durable cultural goods. Via three brief examples, I
took apart and reassembled the Landes and Posner proposition. It
109

Cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the
defendant’s copying constituted fair use despite the fact that the defendant made
complete copies of the plaintiff’s images, because the copying was done “to allow users
to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more information about the image
or the originating web site”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518–
19 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that defendant had a viable fair use defense, despite
copying the entirety of the plaintiff’s computer code, because the defendant’s copying
was an intermediate step in gaining access to unprotectable ideas in that code). But see
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (as
amended on rehearing) (distinguishing Kelly).
110
Cf. Spencer Weber Waller & Brett M. Frischmann, Revitalizing Essential Facilities,
75 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (advocating revival of essential facilities doctrine
in antitrust law, based on the economics of infrastructure).
111
Cf. Aoki, supra note 72, at 768 (advocating use of a limited commons).
112
See Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright on its Head? The Googlization of Everything
and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (2007) (describing a copyright
analysis of the Google project that would bring it into alignment with the concept of an
authentic library).
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appears that durability is a more complex thing. Law plays a key
role, but in underappreciated ways. Successful business models
are durable cultural goods. Directly and indirectly, law is an
inevitable and necessary element of that success. To promote that
success, we should look for underappreciated ways in which law
affects their durability and how law might construct that durability
going forward. In some cases, for example, law might make
intellectual property objects more concrete, salient, and governable
via copyright exclusivity. In other cases, law might make those
objects less discrete and integrate them into the narrative of the
cultural model. Examples drawn from Americana illustrate the
richness of the intellectual property/cultural model intersection.
To assure a durable cultural practice, a sharp, consistent distinction
between intellectual property objects and other cultural and legal
elements is neither required nor always desirable.
I also raised the related question of legitimacy. Durability may
not be enough. What society truly wants are legitimate cultural
forms, including legitimate business models. Making salient law’s
construction of material and conceptual elements of culture helps
in different ways to legitimate those forms, beyond their being
tolerated or accepted by copyright owners, or to undermine their
legitimacy.113 The details of legal engagement bears subtly, but
importantly, on their strength and on the patterns of their evolution.
In terms of its legitimacy, Google Book Search as a constructed
commons overseen by Google itself is a different cultural form and
different business model than a hypothetical Google Book Search
that is neither formally nor functionally controlled by Google or by
copyright owners, even if the pragmatic character of user access is
mostly identical.114 Is one form better or worse, or more or less
113
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (referring to the focal point theory of
legitimacy).
114
See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One
View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297 (2004) (suggesting that some
features of the public domain may be mandatory, rather than discretionary). Achieving
such a system based on the Google archive would present important pragmatic problems
and face perhaps insuperable doctrinal obstacles. The Open Content Alliance, a Google
competitor, is attempting to build a digital archive that more closely resembles a classic
“library.” See Hafner, supra note 107 (describing differences among Google, OCA, and
Microsoft book scanning projects).
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legitimate? Beyond a certain point, simply teasing out the
different roles that law plays cannot help answer that question.
Sorting practices into good ones and bad ones eventually requires
confronting normative choices.115 In the YouTube context, does
Google’s proposed technological solution to the UGC “problem”
represent good social policy? Does Google Book Search represent
desirable social and cultural innovation? These questions can’t be
answered in terms of Constitutional “Progress”; “more” or
“stronger” or “less” intellectual property protection; in terms of
incentives for developing new technologies or business models; or
on the basis of distributed or concentrated modes of production,
business, cultural or otherwise. They may not be answerable at all,
except provisionally. If so, then it is all the more important that we
understand law’s particular contributions to cultural persistence,
not so that society can determine what is best once and for all, but
so that society can influence what it wants and gets now, and for
the foreseeable future.

115

See Cohen, supra note 33, at 92–93.

